Conflict Management and Peace Science
Volume 21, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 233-254

Macedonian border closings in the Kosovo refugee crisis: A game-theoretic perspective (Review)

Williams J.H.P. , Zeager L.A.*
  • a Department of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, United States
  • b Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, United States, Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Brewster A-434, Greenville, NC 27858, United States

Abstract

The 1999 Kosovo crisis generated more than 800,000 refugees, the majority of whom fled into Albania or Macedonia. While Albanians welcomed their ethnic kin, Macedonia closed its border three times. We provide a game-theoretic perspective on strategic interactions between Macedonia and NATO. We use narrative accounts of the crisis to eliminate many configurations of payoffs. Among those remaining, the theory of moves isolates one game that can satisfy the necessary conditions for credible threats: the prisoners' dilemma. Credible threats of border closings in a prisoners' dilemma alter donor incentives and lead to international sharing of asylum burdens in repealed play.

Author Keywords

Asylum Kosovo Refugees Prisoners' dilemma Macedonia Theory of moves

Index Keywords

[No Keywords available]
Link
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-11144299603&doi=10.1080%2f07388940490882523&partnerID=40&md5=7b1d5d78b70042c61a3cdce079532b9c
DOI: 10.1080/07388940490882523
ISSN: 07388942
Cited by: 6
Original Language: English