The European Court of Human Rights increasingly deals with migrants’ complaints about destitution in their host state under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment). This case law has been criticized for not being consistent and/or for not providing migrants with enough protection. Based on a systematic case law search, in this article, I analyse Article 3 case law on migrants’ destitution from a new perspective: the concept of freedom as non-domination, as developed in (neo) republican theory. It will argue that, seen through this lens, many tendencies in the Court’s case law can be explained and constructed as consistent, and it is submitted that in this way the Court does provide migrants with important protection against unfreedom. Nevertheless, I also argue in the article that the case law could be improved in a number of ways in order to provide more effective and robust protection against domination. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.

Positive obligations Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights Migrants Inhuman and degrading treatment Asylum seekers Living conditions

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