The concept of 'discrimination' has several meanings and usages in refugee law. It goes to the very core of the refugee law regime, yet it does not have a clear definition. This article seeks to explore and critique the ways in which 'discrimination' is interpreted and applied by decision makers in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is primarily concerned with 'cumulative grounds discrimination': namely, the understanding in refugee law that the cumulative effect of various discriminatory measures can amount to persecution, even where each incident of discrimination alone would not suffice. It critically analyzes the approaches of decision makers in such cases, in light of various statements of principle made by UNHCR. This article raises a number of questions, issues and inconsistencies that merit further research and consideration. It argues that decision makers should adopt a broader approach in discrimination cases: they should consider the impact of discrimination on the meaningful and effective enjoyment of rights, as well as on the individual and his or her ability to live a dignified life. The article concludes that adopting a broader approach in discrimination cases would be more consistent with fundamental principles of international human rights and refugee law: equality, non-discrimination and the inherent dignity of all human beings. © The Author (2010). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

[No Keywords available]

New Zealand Canada United Kingdom refugee Australia decision making international law human rights United States migration