It is an open secret that many people commonly referred to as 'refugees' in popular discourse are not 'refugees' within the meaning of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. For a person is only a 'refugee' as that term is defined in the Convention and Protocol if, inter alia, he or she flees persecution. In turn, those not fleeing persecution lack a comparably entrenched right under international law not to be forcibly returned to the threats they fled. Given the pressing humanitarian considerations and political tensions created by this aspect of international law, we should question anew whether it is just. The most influential criticism of it has been presented by Andrew Shacknove, who argued that justice demands instead that refugee status be afforded to the broader class of people fleeing serious threats subject to human control. Yet Shacknove's critics typically argue that his proposal should be resisted because: (1) unlike the persecuted, those facing threats other than persecution can generally be assisted in their own countries; and (2) expanding refugee status would place undue burdens on States, the persecuted, or both. However, this article will demonstrate that neither of these objections justifies refusing to extend refugee status. That is, they do not justify the refusal to extend a comparably entrenched status under international law as is enjoyed by Convention refugees to people fleeing threats other than persecution. Nevertheless, the article further argues that Shacknove's proposal is itself too limited. Rather than depending on whether the threat one flees is subject to human control, refugee status should depend instead on the severity of the threat one flees and the likelihood that it will materialize if one returns. © The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

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international law morality refugee