Revista de Economia Institucional
Volume 14, Issue 27, 2012, Pages 147-164

FARC and the costs of kidnapping [Las FARC y los costos del secuestro] (Article)

María del Pilar Castillo V.* , Balbinotto G.
  • a Universidad Federal de Rio Grande del Sur (UFRGS), Brazil
  • b Universidad Federal de Rio Grande del Sur (UFRGS), Brazil

Abstract

This article analyzes, from an agency theory perspective, the effects produced on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by both political kidnapping as a long-run political strategy, and its long duration caused by Álvaro Uribe's government decision to not accept prisoner exchanges. These elements led to a separation between the FARC leaders' objectives and the goals of its field commanders. In such a case, the connection between them reveals the existence of a moral hazard problem which has become stronger and more harmful over time.

Author Keywords

kidnapping Agency theory Contracts

Index Keywords

[No Keywords available]
Link
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84871635987&partnerID=40&md5=6acb4321cc869b1d288c60ad9674b77d
ISSN: 01245996
Cited by: 3
Original Language: English; Spanish