European Journal of Political Economy
Volume 28, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 249-265
Compliance with the Anti-trafficking Protocol (Article)
Cho S.-Y.* ,
Vadlamannati K.C.
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a
Department of Economics, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, Goettingen, 37073, Germany
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b
Alfred-Weber Institute for Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Strasse 58, Heidelberg, 69115, Germany
Abstract
The Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects the interests of the major countries. Due to the high costs of compliance, countries will strategically select those obligations that will satisfy the major countries most efficiently with lower costs of compliance. Among the three main obligations of the Protocol - prevention, protection and prosecution - we predict that ratification leads to the strongest effect on compliance with the prevention policy because prevention reflects the key interests of the major countries, while triggering less domestic resistance and political costs to implement. Therefore, it is the most 'efficient' form of compliance. We empirically test this hypothesis by employing panel data from 147 countries during the period of 2001-2009. As the theory predicts, the ratification of the Protocol has the strongest effect on the prevention policy of a member state compared to protection and prosecution. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
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Link
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84855801229&doi=10.1016%2fj.ejpoleco.2011.12.003&partnerID=40&md5=5fddba859f5fc0cdcb2fbc58f8615b6a
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.003
ISSN: 01762680
Cited by: 23
Original Language: English