With a perfectly elastic supply of immigrants and no domestic distortions, the pure Pareto gains to residents from immigration are maximized by an open door immigration policy. The only role then for entry charges is cost recovery. With inelastic supply, charges may be levied for optimal tariff reasons. Priceable externalities provide a rationale for charging if there are difficulties in making discriminatory reimbursements of optimal toll revenues to residents. Otherwise, relevant externalities should be internalized via appropriate Pigovian taxes and discriminatory reimbursements paid to residents. Then, an open door policy without entry charges should be pursued. Where quotas are imposed for political reasons or to ease potentially unfavorable distributional implications, there are convincing second-best arguments for fees and, equivalently, quota auctions. The latter policies are generally preferable to unpriced quotas and to asset tests. -from Author

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Migrant Workers policy option economics population social policy demography Population Dynamics policy financial management health care manpower Health Manpower charging system economic advantage Migrants--cost resident gain Fees entry charge Article Fees and Charges fee migration international migration Demographic Factors World Emigration and Immigration Economic Factors Transients and Migrants Financial Activities Human Resources public policy employment Labor Force theoretical studies Migration Policy Population Policy immigrant population